Kofi Annan e il vicolo cieco siriano

Riportiamo qui di seguito una parte dell’ultimo breve rapporto dell’International Crisis Group (Icg), dedicato alle esigue possibilità di successo della missione di Kofi Annan, sabato 10 marzo 2012 a Damasco. Annan è stato nominato inviato speciale dell’Onu e della Lega Araba per la Siria.

Oltre a illustrare perché la proposta di Annan troverà difficilmente d’accordo il regime, dopo esser stata già ampiamente criticata dalle opposizioni, l’Icg mette in luce il vicolo cieco in cui si trova il regime. Ciò non vuol dire che il potere degli Assad sia destinato a dissolversi nel breve termine, ma indica l’impossibilità di un ripristino della sua legittimità e autorità pre-marzo 2011.

Even if the regime can survive for some time, it has become virtually impossible to see how it can ultimately prevail or restore normalcy. It might not fall, but it would become a shadow of itself, an assortment of militias fighting a civil war.

Today, it continues to enjoy substantial military superiority over the opposition (a reflection of its monop- oly on heavy weaponry and a still substantial reservoir of troops, security officials and civilian proxies) and for the most part has succeeded in both containing peaceful protests and fending off armed groups. Yet, it has been una- ble to achieve sustained progress anywhere in the country.

Its conduct on the ground – including excessive use of force by regular troops, the security sector’s sectarian behaviour, persistent resort to civilian proxies, horrendous treatment of detainees and indiscriminate punishment of entire swathes of the population – precludes even a sem- blance of normalisation.

Given enough time, the regime might be able to destroy the urban and social fabric of entire neighbourhoods, as it appears to have done in parts of Homs. But that will only reinvigorate protests and armed resistance elsewhere.

Politically, the regime has mobilised its narrowing, if still significant popular base; exacerbated and exploited the Alawite minority’s fears; but shirked serious outreach that could possibly appeal to the growing number of Syrians appalled by large-scale, brutal repression. As even the most pragmatic opposition members see it, the dialogue it proposes would be a pointless exercise designed to validate its precooked, unilateral and limited reforms.

The constitutional referendum on 26 February was a case in point: it touched on what mattered least (the status of the Baath party, already an empty shell) and ignored what mattered most (the security services’ sectarian make-up and shameful performance, and the nature of the country’s leader- ship). The latter is critical: President Assad retains significant backing but, having behaved as leader of one camp determined to crush the other, he has forfeited any claim to nationwide legitimacy.