Siria, la ricetta di Luay Hussein

Luay Hussein, dissidente siriano alawita, ha fondato di recente in patria la corrente per l’Edificazione dello Stato siriano, sigla dell’opposizione finora tollerata dal regime.

In carcere dal 1984 al 1991, Hussein (foto) è stato uno degli organizzatori della conferenza tenuta all’albergo Semiramis di Damasco svoltasi a fine giugno e a cui hanno partecipato oltre 200 tra oppositori, pseudo-tali, intellettuali autentici e improvvisati e agenti dei servizi di controllo.

Camille Otrakji (alias Alex), siriano cristiano e per il momento unico amministratore di Syria Comment – sito di approfondimento sulla Siria contemporanea avviato e per lunghi anni moderato dall’americano Joshua Landis, sposato con la figlia di un generale alawita – ha intervistato Hussein.

Al di là di alcune domande, in particolare la quarta e la quinta che chiariscono dove batte il cuore di Otrakji, è interessante notare come questo stimato e rispettato dissidente siriano in patria critichi l’assenza di un programma chiaro da parte dell’opposizione all’estero (il Consiglio nazionale siriano), in particolare per quanto riguarda le modalità per far cadere il regime.

Nell’intervista, Otrakji non lo interroga a proposito, ma Hussein ha pubblicato sul sito della sua neonata corrente un documento programmatico in cui indica anche una strategia da seguire. Qui suggerisce un approccio morbido col regime: avviando prima di tutto negoziati per riportare le forze lealiste dentro le loro caserme e le loro case.

A voi il compito di giudicare, ma a mio avviso dopo oltre sette mesi di sanguinosa repressione è fin troppo evidente che il regime – quello vero, non quello di facciata – non intende scendere a compromessi o negoziare.

Detto questo, le critiche di Hussein circa l’assenza di un programma chiaro da parte del Cns sono senza dubbio fondate, ma è anche vero che nessun’altra forza di opposizione reale ha finora offerto una ricetta definita per la caduta del regime.

La ragione va ricercata nel fatto che di fronte a uno squilibrio di forze così palese è difficile per un popolo, da 40 anni sotto il tacco della dittatura e senza una radicata coscienza politica, produrre una classe di intellettuali in grado di elaborare una strategia concreta per rovesciare l’ordine costituito. Lo stesso documento di Hussein non offre soluzioni realmente applicabili sul terreno.

Un altro punto sollevato nell’intervista di Otrakji riguarda la presunta pressione esercitata dall’Occidente per vedere unificate le opposizioni siriane. Nella domanda di Syria Comment e nella risposta del dissidente alawita si desume che chi spinge per creare un’unica entità politica opposta agli al-Asad è di fatto sponsorizzato dall’Occidente e, dunque, ha un’agenda estranea a quella del popolo siriano.

Fino all’altro ieri, dagli stessi pulpiti si lamentava però che il fronte delle opposizioni siriane era troppo diviso, frammentato, e quindi immaturo, incapace di fornire una versione alternativa a quella del regime, di non esser capace di rappresentare le istanze del popolo siriano. Anche in questo caso si chiede forse l’impossibile a chi tenta di proporsi come opposizione.

In Syria Comment non è esplicitato ma tra le righe è evidente che si cerca di screditare l’azione del Cns, di cui fanno parte com’è noto numerosi esponenti dei Fratelli musulmani in esilio e di altre correnti del sunnismo siriano. Se Luay Hussein, come afferma nella sua prima risposta a Otrakji, invita le opposizioni a unirsi al suo progetto, va bene. Se il Cns cerca di aggregare altre sigle sotto il suo ombrello, allora non va bene. E il regime gongola.

Qui di seguito l’intervista di Syria Comment a Hussein.

Q1. You recently launched “Building the Syrian State” political current (تيار بناء الدولة السورية) and announced a possible conference for founding members early next month. What are your priorities and objectives for the near future?

Louay: Our priority is to find a made-in-Syria solution that can help us prevent more bloodshed in Syria and can plan for the removal of the oppressive regime in a peaceful and secure way.  We think that such a solution can be reached through the establishment of a wide coalition of opposition forces that agree to adopt a national working plan that we proposed among other documents. If we succeed in establishing such a coalition, it would be possible for us to work next on aligning Syrian public opinion with our efforts to confront the regime.

Q2. What are your current’s views of the “Coordination Committee” (mostly made of internal Syrian opposition figures) and the “Syrian National Council” SNC (external opposition)? How do you interpret the difficulties that prevented the Coordination Committee from holding a conference in Paris days ago? Was there a French government bias in favor of the National Council and against the Coordination Committee?  If yes, then why? Do you suspect that the French were acting on a request by the National Council to silence the Coordination Committee?

Louay Hussein: Our current has favorable views of all parties, coalitions or forces that already exist or are being formed, as long as they seek to protect national unity and reject outside military intervention and reject militarization of the uprising. This includes the Coordination Committee. I do not have any specific information that can explain the obstruction of the Coordination Committee’s conference in Paris but I tend to suspect an attempt by some influential foreign elements to establish a single Syrian opposition body, the National Council in this case. Uniting the opposition at any cost is a westernstrategy. Their support for the National Council in every possible way is expected, especially after the Council’s wobbly start.

Q3. Many observers believe that after seven months it is safe to conclude that protests will continue and the regime will not fall anytime soon. What are your expectations for the coming year? If you expect more bloodshed, what can the Syrian people expect next from both the regime and the opposition if they both care to try to stop the bloodshed? Do you expect the leaders in the regime and the opposition to continue to resist any compromise and to trade accusations of responsibility for the violence?

Louay Hussein:  I believe there are two reasons why demonstrations will significantly diminish; First, the violent oppression by the authorities recently and second, the increase in the number of armed operations by groups opposed to the authorities such as “The Free Syrian Army”. This is why I expect more bloodshed in Syria. Moreover, I worry that if we fail to reach a homegrown settlement of the conflict very quickly, we will clearly witness different aspects of a civil war in the near future.  Facing this reality and looking back at the past seven months I am afraid both the regime and the leadership of the opposition did not prove at all they are up to their responsibilities at the national level. This is why each of them is throwing the ball to the other’s court and both proved unable to introduce serious and realistic initiatives. I am disappointed at, and I blame the leaders of the opposition who did not dare to try to lead the street instead preferring to proudly act merely as an echo of the voice of the street. Take for example the slogan of “down with the regime”. It was adopted by some of the opposition leaders as if it was a full political platform. We heard them repeat it day and night but without telling us how they will bring down the regime and what is the mechanism for bringing it down and how will they deal with the regime’s security and military establishments and how they will deal with the regime’s supporters. Especially after events proved that bringing down the regime simply through people power is not an easy, or even possible, task within the existing balance of power.

Q4. Regime supporters are quick to point out that the most enthusiastic supporters of regime change in Syria are Syria’s traditional enemies, Israel and the United States in addition to some of the least democratic and most sectarian Arab countries. Do you believe that these forces are genuinely concerned about the Syrian people or are they in fact more interested in the weaker Syria they expect to emerge after the protests?

Louay Hussein: Every country prefers weaker other countries in order to enjoy more power at all levels. This assumption is not at the foundation of the conflict in Syria. All the states you mentioned in your question need stability in Syria. This is the reason why they are trying to provide alternatives to the regime in case the street managed to shake the regime until it disintegrated and fell. Those countries worry that by then a security mess will hurt their national interests.

Q5. Reforms in other “Arab Spring” countries (Tunisia, Egypt and even Libya) are taking much longer to implement than previously anticipated. Why is it that you believe President Assad should be able to implement reforms faster and better than they are being implemented in other “Arab Spring” countries.

Louay Hussein: Syria was a much easier case. President Assad did not lead for too long and he was not rejected by his people. Therefore, he could have achieved progress in reforms that please everyone, with considerable ease. Reforms could have been implemented quite fast because Syria was stable and its political opposition that existed was not interested in confronting the authority. It was more interested in applying pressure on it for its failure to implement political reforms.